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fictocritical empathy
and the work of mourning
HEATHER KERR
Ethics/aesthetics and the dialectic of empathy
Fictocritical effects in the service of ethically self-conscious cross-cultural writing belong
to the larger category of ‘trauma studies’, conducted under the sign of the anti-aesthetic.1
Such a project proceeds as if ethics and aesthetics are not or need not be estranged from
one another. This is evident in aesthetic practices that aim to ‘heal’ through cross-cultural
reconciliation, often figured in imaginative acts of empathy/sympathy. Gail Jones has
asked:
Where, in our theorising, is the space of the elegiac? … The spaces of political bravery.
Of risk. Of loss. Post-colonial studies is a melancholy field, concerned as it is with the
elucidation of barbarity. Perhaps, therefore it needs access to a language (a tone, a
poetics) to express the ethical imperatives of mourning.2
What is at stake in this fictocritical aesthetic remediation? What existing practices would
it re-function, supplement or supersede? Is mourning adequate to the task of cross-
cultural reconciliation? How might fictocritical effects be animated in the service of this
aim? In the process of exploring these questions I will suggest that the methodology of
mourning is an allegorical vehicle for cross-cultural writing. Employed to remediate the
colonial inheritance, it nonetheless requires acts of empathy according to models of the
imagination that are part and parcel of that inheritance.
To explore such conjunctions of ethics and aesthetics in the context of Australian
fictocritical writing is to confront the rejection of ‘empathy’ as a necessary and
—
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Here he is thinking specifically of writers of grunge fiction and the possibilities of a
‘young public’ being formed around them. These writers were popular at writers’
festivals, Wark claims, when ‘grunge’ was a marketable category, but ‘I’m still waiting for
the gatekeepers to give them a go as broadcasters on ABC Radio National, or as
columnists in the newspapers, or to feature at conferences organised by bodies like the
National Book Council’.51 In making this point, Wark demonstrates that it is the media
‘vector’ of fiction, alongside the Internet and womens magazines, which he points out as
unacknowledged public forums of debate, that militates against these writers as much as
their youth. In an interview with Robert Dessaix, Don Anderson has claimed ‘I don’t
think that literary intellectuals—or let’s say literary practitioners such as poets, novelists
or dramatists—ought to have more attention paid to them when they speak about larger
issues of state than anybody else with an informed vote’.52
To encourage a view of literary practice as preparatory work for the role of public
social commentary in more authoritative forms of discourse is not a viable option for the
discipline of Creative Writing, as this neglects a consideration of the work writers do as
writers. Of course, some writing courses teach fiction and poetry alongside journalistic
and professional writing, and many writers function as reviewers and journalists to
supplement their income, but I am interested in retaining the integrity of Creative
Writing as a discipline of intellectual work rather than denying that writers can perform
in other modes of public discourse.
It is, of course, notoriously difficult to define exactly what literature is: is it non-
fiction; figurative language; writing which employs ‘literary’ techniques such as narrative,
character, etc.; writing which evokes emotional rather than intellectual responses; writing
which is creative or imaginative? It is relatively easy, however, to accept what sort of
writing operates as literature. Literature is what fiction or poetry editors accept for
publication, what gets shelved in those sections in bookshops, what is reviewed in those
categories in newspapers and magazines, what wins literary prizes and grants. Literature
is what people read when they want to be entertained, or to escape into a fictional world,
or to appreciate the heightened uses of language. Literature is what thousands of
students across Australia want to write when they enrol in Creative Writing courses. So
while literature may be just another form of cultural production, and cannot be defended
as a special type of language, it is nonetheless the assumption of aesthetic difference that
governs its operation in society. ‘The ontological groundlessness of literature’, John
Guillory reminds us, ‘in no way diminishes its social effects as a means of marking the
status of certain texts and genres’.53 In which case, to treat it simply as another type of
writing, as a form of rhetoric to be mastered alongside advertising and journalistic copy,
may help overcome unproductive preconceptions held by some students, such as that of
VOLUME9 NUMBER1 MAY2003172
or cultural critique of received opinion, with the ultimate aim of effecting social change,
or at least alteration of public opinion, beyond the refinements of disciplinary
knowledge. If Creative Writing is able to elaborate a figure of the writer as a literary
intellectual in this sense, it will claim a stronger disciplinary position within the New
Humanities than it will by perpetuating a theory/practice divide or evading it with hybrid
forms of writing. The narrative of generic supersession implied by a category such as
fictocriticism, which nonetheless relies for its dynamism on a continued separation
between creative and critical genres, does not help address the issue of how purportedly
‘naïve’ works of literature, such as realist novels or confessional poems, operate in
contemporary society or critical practice. Nor does it help provide strategies for the
writing workshop to discuss and teach these far more popular forms of literature.
One of the main problems seen to be facing attempts by academics to operate as
public intellectuals is the Research Quantum, which will award points to refereed journal
articles, but not to articles in mass-circulation newspapers or magazines. This is also the
problem that faces teachers of Creative Writing. Those who teach in Creative Writing are
hired not only because of their academic records, but because of their publishing record
outside the academy. In this case, teachers of writing wish to claim research points for
their ‘public’ writing.
The traditional PhD is a rite of passage for young intellectuals seeking academic work,
but its emphasis on what Judith Brett calls ‘the endless qualification’, and the necessity
for specialisation rather than overarching commentary, means that it is designed for
examiners rather than a general, even a general academic readership.49 Creative Writing
is somewhat different. Those who undertake postgraduate work in this discipline are
more likely to be seeking a general audience rather than an academic one, because their
medium is not academic prose, but fictional or poetic writing. But if writers address a
public, they are not considered as intellectuals, or at least, not in the form with which
they make this address.
If the forum of the public intellectual is the media, the form is non-fiction—reviews,
essays, newspaper columns, public lectures, panel sessions, television and radio
interviews. A writer of novels and stage or screenplays, and less commonly of poetry, can
command a presence as a public intellectual, but only by stepping outside the realms of
fiction and operating in the forms mentioned above. That is, writers’ fictional work may
get them noticed in the public sphere, but they can only operate and be acknowledged as
public intellectuals if they write columns, give lectures or provide interviews. For
instance McKenzie Wark has claimed that ‘If there is one little window through which
younger people get into traditional zones of public life at the moment it is creative
writing’.50
181HEATHER KERR—FICTOCRITICAL EMPATHY
sufficiently ‘radical aesthetic’. In her only reference to empathy in The Radical Aesthetic,
Isobel Armstrong states that:
[t]his linked visual and spatial accommodation is important, for a freeing up of space
for others has a double political and territorial and imaginative movement that has
consequences for civil society … Empathy is essentially a power-ridden construction of
relations and a sentimental understanding of ‘community’. It is an individualist reading
of what must belong to a collective experience.3
Perhaps the charge of individualism is to some extent inevitable if fictocritical writers are
committed to proceed ‘case by case’, an ‘I’ and a ‘thou’.4 Armstrong’s understanding of
‘empathy’ invokes categories evident in Australian cross-cultural fictocritical writing (for
example, space, movement, imagination). Also evident is a positive valence given to what
might be called the sentimental imagination. My broad question is: can Australian cross-
cultural fictocritical writing re-function the sentimental tradition as a counter-discursive
and radical aesthetic?
The aim is not to diagnose the presence or absence of sentimentality so much as to
deploy sentimentality as a diagnostic tool. In pursuing these categories into fictocritical
writing in the cross-cultural field it will be evident that the modernist disparagement of
‘sentiment’ and the Kantian rupture between thought and feeling have been replaced by a
concept of ‘sentiment’, which values these categories’ involvement in one another. Cross-
cultural remedial methodology relies on the re-aestheticising of the ethical domain.
Instead of defining the aesthetic as a separate order of significance distinct from the
cognitive and ethical spheres, the ethical and the aesthetic emerge in this work of
reconciliation as a revived eighteenth-century conjunction. Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl
of Shaftesbury, for example, regarded the ethical and the aesthetic as exercises of the
same (imaginative) faculty.5 Joseph Addison and Richard Steele affirmed the sentimental
imagination’s responsiveness to the suffering and distress of others: ‘sentiment …
originally meant not simply feeling, but feeling justified by a moral idea’. Postcolonial
cross-cultural writing, understood as an example of a ‘modern ideological passion’, is a
‘true avatar of moral sentimentalism’.6
In this sense, the ‘affective’, ‘ethical’ and ‘aesthetic’ turns repeatedly diagnosed in
contemporary culture belong together as instances of the post-romantic inheritance of
the sentimental tradition. In attempting to make the affective (feeling) perform the work
of the ethical (thought) through a species of identification, contemporary cultural analysis
at the same time tries to keep the distinction between thought and feeling in place, thus
re-enacting the central problem of sentiment. We inherit these concepts as side by side
yet distinguished from each other, ‘neighbouring’ in their ‘separation’.7 Even now the
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Bob Hodge wrote in 1995 that the ‘values which people working in cultural studies
and the New Humanities sincerely and strongly hold are labelled as political
correctness’.45 Anti-political correctness campaigns flooded the American media in the
early 1990s and forced humanities departments to defend their activities publicly, while
privately questioning them. In the introduction to an anthology of essays entitled After
Political Correctness, the editors claimed that the book was designed to develop prospects
‘for a more public humanities’ by ‘redesigning and expanding the social and cultural role
of the academic humanities’.46 It is due to both the conservative critique within the
media of the dangers of political correctness, and the disillusionment with dehistoricised
Theory of left-leaning intellectuals within the academy, that the idea of the public
intellectual gains purchase throughout the 1990s.
In Australia complaints about political correctness gained a much broader social
context with the election of a conservative federal government in 1996. The term was
levelled against so-called cultural ‘elites’, characterised as left-wing apologists for
minority interest groups. This coincided with savage funding cuts to university budgets.
So the need for humanities departments to identify ways in which they are relevant to
society also arose in the face of a growing managerial culture in universities, evident in
Australia in the decade or so from the Dawkins reforms to the 1999 white paper on
research and research training by David Kemp, which emphasised accountability to
public funds and encouraged a culture of entrepreneurialism.47
These social and institutional pressures overlap with the goals of Cultural Studies
itself, an interdisciplinary enterprise concerned with producing politically engaged
critiques of the everyday and the power relationships involved in culture as a whole way
of life. This overlap is most evident in the development of that section of Cultural Studies
known as Cultural Policy, which, according to Tony Bennett, was both a practical
response to the Dawkins reforms and a theoretical reformulation of cultural theory and
critical practice along Foucauldian lines.48
Creative writing and public intellectuals
The public intellectual has become the exemplary figure of the New Humanities, not
necessarily as a model which individual academics can aspire to and train students to
take up, but as a zone of contestation, a discursive site in which debates about the
institutional function of the humanities in the wider community are played out. There is
no specific figure of literary authority in the New Humanities, no critic to proclaim upon
literature as a distinct realm. Rather, there is a more free-ranging figure of the intellectual
whose work is motivated by oppositional criticism in its broadest sense, that is, textual
—
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asserted conduction between them is achieved through the deployment of abstract terms
such as ‘motion’ or ‘movement’, along with other words that describe the work of the
imagination familiar in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century thought.8 The ‘sympathetic’
and ‘ethical’ imaginations are characteristically ‘active’ in this oscillation between thought
and feeling, an aesthetic effect that requires the aesthetic order to be distinguished but
not separated from the ethical.9 In the hermeneutics of sympathy implied by elegiac
historiography the poetics of elegy would move the reader to ‘respond with a concomitant
emotion and imagination … to answer the [writer’s] call’, a dynamic in which it is
implied that writer and reader contribute equally.10 In a thus renovated postcolonial field
the work of sympathy nonetheless ‘takes place within the realm of fiction, mimesis,
representation, and reproduction … our experience of sympathy depends on an aesthetic
experience. Sympathy in this sense is always already an aesthetic experience.’11
Jones’s speculation that an aestheticised ethics might remediate the theoreticism of
postcolonial studies seems to imply that empathic responsiveness to suffering (past and
present) would activate mourning as a methodology. Before mapping the concepts of
melancholy and mourning, I want to explore briefly some possible models of empathy/
sympathy that might prove adequate to this culturally therapeutic task. I will suggest that
the dialectical interplay of ethics and aesthetics, thought and feeling, sketched above is
replicated in the conceptualising of empathy. Further, I will suggest that the same
conceptualisation describes the processes of melancholy and mourning. As a
methodology then, postcolonial empathic fictocriticism might be expected to repeat the
dialectical interplay of ethics and aesthetics inherited from the sentimental tradition. In
particular, I will argue that fictocritical effects in the field of postcolonial studies redeploy
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century models, although the currently dominant terms
(empathy and ethics) usually replace an earlier vocabulary of ‘sympathy’ and ‘morals’.12
What Armstrong calls the linked visual and spatial model of empathic accommodation,
a double territorial and imaginative movement, hints at the key issue for Thomas
McCarthy in models of empathy: ‘the way in which the self participates intellectually and
emotionally in the experience of the Other’.13 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
‘sympathy’ is a particular idea of the imagination and a central moral and aesthetic
problem. The sympathetic imagination ‘is able to penetrate the barrier which puts space
between it and its object’ and ‘secure a momentary but complete identification with it’.14
As a simultaneously intellectual and emotional activity, this momentary, paradoxical self-
transcendence and self-involvement is often described in metaphors of movement. James
Engell summarises the early nineteenth-century complex of activities associated with
romantic sympathy: the ability to ‘escape’ the self, to ‘identify with other people’, to
‘perceive things in a new way’ and to ‘coalesce’ subject and object.15 According to
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The public intellectual
The current preoccupation with the idea of the public intellectual seems to have been
prompted by Russel Jacoby’s The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age of Academe
(1987). In this book Jacoby claimed that preoccupation with intellectuals as a
sociological class was symptomatic of a decline in public intellectual life and the dearth
of independent intellectuals, or ‘writers and thinkers who address a general and educated
audience’.40 Since the publication of Jacoby’s book the idea of a public intellectual has
engaged critical interest throughout the 1990s, becoming the subject of several symposia
and conferences, and seeping into our general lexicon.41 That the function of criticism
has become absorbed in this wider concern with the social role of the intellectual is
evidenced by Edward Said’s 1993 Reith Lectures, published as Representations of the
Intellectuals. In The World, the Text and the Critic, Said spoke of the ‘critical consciousness’
being embodied in the oppositional critic and called for a more ‘worldly’ textual
criticism. Ten years later he had shifted from a vision of criticism within the university to
a vision of the intellectual outside the university. He speaks of the need for intellectuals
to operate as independent ‘amateurs’, rather than institutionalised professionals, and to
‘speak the truth to power’.42
Debate about the figure of the public intellectual and what it represents is generally
organised around the terms established by Jacoby’s book: that intellectual work now
takes place largely within the academy. Those who agree with Jacoby are concerned with
how academics can overcome their professional myopia and engage with the general
public by moving between academia and the world of journalism, either to overcome the
obscurantist jargon of Theory, or to disseminate the insights of Theory more broadly.
Those who disagree challenge his outmoded concept of the public sphere and argue that
as teachers in public institutions, as researchers who publish their work, and as
professional media consultants, academics already operate as public intellectuals. Or they
point out that academics cannot simply choose to become public intellectuals; this
depends on the workings of the media.43
What has given the figure of the public intellectual its current cachet, however, is the
fact that jeremiads against its disappearance, attempts to revive it, and defences of
academic work all overlap with moves to reconfigure the humanities as an institution with
greater public influence. One recommendation of the 1998 review of the humanities,
Knowing Ourselves and Others, was that ‘Universities further facilitate and provide
incentives for the contributions that academics make to the public discussion of issues of
importance’ and ‘extend the connections between Humanities scholars and the media’.44
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McCarthy, romantic ‘Absorption in the Other … demands a great degree of self-consciousness,
an ostensibly paradoxical dialectic which illustrates sympathy’s roots in moral as well as
aesthetic theory’.16 The problems that accompany this dialectic remain pressing and are
reflected in Armstrong’s understanding of empathy as power-ridden and individualist.
Does sympathy/empathy, as McCarthy argues, require a ‘blurring of self and Other’; how
is the self involved with and differentiated from the other? ‘Does self-awareness follow
from Other-awareness; to what extent is the focus in sympathy on the self versus the
Other?’ In this dialectical model of sympathy/empathy, thought and feeling produce a
‘shared experiential space between the sympathetic self and the Other’.17
McCarthy’s summary of recent psychological models under the heading ‘empathy and
cognition’ lists four phases of empathy that might be regarded in part as the
contemporary afterlife of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century sentimentalism. First, an
involuntary identification, in which ‘we are projected into the other person by our own
fantasy, response, or feeling’. Second, ‘incorporation’, or ‘taking the other person into
ourselves’. Third, ‘the dialectic between the actual me and the me which is identified
with the other person’, and fourth, ‘detachment’, or deliberately moving away ‘to gain the
social and psychic distance necessary for objective analysis’. The effects of ‘absorption
and blurring of identities’, characteristically described as motion or reverberation, ‘imply
a back-and-forth movement and suggest that empathy is a process’, not a moment.18
Empathy works the gap between self and other and repeats the dialectical oscillation
between sameness and difference, thought and feeling, ethics and aesthetics inherited
from a non-Kantian tradition of moral philosophy.
Gail Jones provides a striking visual equivalent of empathy as an active process, ‘based
on the necessity to reconcile the presumed separation between self and other’,19 in her
fictocritical essay ‘Thaumatropes’:
I possess a small antiquarian scientific toy called, somewhat ostentatiously, a
thaumatrope. Despite its name it is blithely simple, consisting of a series of cardboard
discs strung on a string. When the discs are rotated, by breath or manipulation, images
on either side are visually combined. On one side … is a black Mammy figure, on the
other a white baby; when the disc spins around the woman appears to hold the baby.
(This is an especially captivating image for me because it recapitulates a childhood dream
in which I believed myself the daughter of an Aboriginal mother.)20
The oscillation between objectification, a ‘looking at the Other’, and a ‘blurring of
identities’ that enacts the ‘fantasy’ of ‘incorporation’ is followed by the ‘dialectic between
the actual me’ of the self-conscious narrator and ‘me’ identified with the ‘other person’.
Jones’s self-reflexive writing also stages the final ‘detachment’ and ‘objective analysis’ in
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domain of knowledge (literature), but do not own the means of production (the
publishing industry), and they are distinguished from unskilled wage earners by their
possession of cultural capital—in this case, their talent and professional writing skills.
The aesthetic, or literary value, is thus an economic commodity.
It is obvious that Creative Writing is one institutional site of the literary establishment,
for it does provide employment for writers as writers, and skills training for aspirants. It
does not, however, perform a necessary function in the reproduction of literature.
Teachers of Creative Writing do not need university positions to write (although they
may need the income to support their writing) and students do not become qualified
writers by virtue of their study. In which case, Creative Writing must have another
function beyond its ‘official’ purpose of employing and training writers; it must have a
function specific to the university.
The university is a site for the reproduction of a broad intellectual or professional–
managerial class via professional training and accreditation. In other words, the
university is not where the knowledge class operates, but where it trains and recruits.
Humanist academics, or those cultural intellectuals who are trained and accredited to
stay within the university, are members of a broader class of knowledge workers, but
their professional domain of knowledge remains largely within its main apparatus of
reproduction. So if Creative Writing is a site for the professional training of writers, but is
not a necessary system of accreditation, its main function is to contribute to the domain
of knowledge of cultural intellectuals within the academy by the provision of a literary
education. The performance of this necessary function in fact contributes to the goal of
reproducing literature as a profession through the employment and training of writers,
precisely because the domain of knowledge that incorporates Creative Writing takes
literature as its object of study. This knowledge sustains the profession of literature by
affording it cultural prestige—thus increasing its capital or potential to generate more
capital, not to mention the direct sales generated by reading lists.
In order to reconcile its professed but not accredited purpose of training writers with
its necessary function as a contribution to academic teaching and research, Creative
Writing, however, must elaborate a figure of the writer capable of straddling these two
domains. The model of the writer as a professional artist for whom the university is
only a place for the transmission of craft skills and a knowledge of literary models
lacks the symbolic force to perform this reconciliation between unaccredited purpose
and necessary function. I will argue that it is the pseudo-mythic model of the public
intellectual who can straddle the academic world and the public sphere, and has become
the exemplary figure of the New Humanities, which provides the way forward for
Creative Writing.
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which the space between self and other opens again. The vigorous movement of the
thaumatrope produces a model for a briefly shared intersubjective space, an empathic
reconciliation. The empathic process is like a ‘bold swinging—demanding the most
intensive stirring of one’s being into the life of the other’, physical metaphors that recall
the late-eighteenth-century ideas of self-transcendence.21 The thaumatrope is an object to
think with, literalising the movement, identification, fantastic projection, incorporation,
self-conscious oscillation between subject positions, and analytic detachment that
characterise the sentimental imagination in its empathic mode.
Jones allegorises the thaumatrope’s pre-cinematic montage as ‘a kind of metaphor for
cross-cultural scholarship’—‘hoping to set in process a dialectic by which … the self and
other will breezily combine, cultures discontinuous will appear continuous’, all the time
knowing this is an ‘anterior misrepresentation’. Jones acknowledges a need to honour
‘the exquisite, grave and finally humane banality of affect itself’, using the thaumatrope
to perform her desire: ‘the impelling exhalation, the fast-motioning embrace of that
which wishes to reconvene, ideally and utopianly, the beautiful black woman with the
small white baby’.22 The dialectic enacted by the thaumatrope produces a series of
intersubjective relays that characterise empathy as a linked visual and spatial effect, in
particular the simultaneous availability of multiple viewpoints. Recent scholarship,
surveyed by Thompson, suggests that empathy ‘provides a viewpoint in which one’s
centre of orientation becomes one among others’, ideally without hierarchy.23
The same dialectic of self and other, neighbouring and separation, has been offered as
the condition of possibility for an ethical politics of text and commentary. In the face of a
need for what they call a ‘more self-conscious mode of textual commentary’, Bob Hodge
and Alec McHoul suggest that fictocriticism might model a practice ‘where the term
“commentary” itself might now be under erasure’.24 Their model includes the political,
territorial and imaginative movement that empathic criticism requires in order to free up
a space for others.
Of course this would mean risking falling into the well-defined spaces of mastery and
libertarianism. Those grooves would always be beckoning to either side of the space or
spacing between them. But it remains the case that any such pair of grooves (if they are in
any way distinct, and we think they are) must as it were, throw up a ridge between them.
It is this ridge that we would be wanting to negotiate (almost in the topographical sense).25
Fictocriticism might produce an empathic critical stance, a shared textual horizon
somewhere in the spaces produced by what Heidegger calls ‘the struggle’ between
a critical practice that ‘leaps in and dominates’ and another that ‘leaps forth and
liberates’.26
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I suggest that the distinction between the practice of artists and the theory of critics
can be circumnavigated by collapsing both figures into that of the intellectual, a figure
that incorporates both, without the need for hybridity, because it is based on a vision of
social agency rather than a theory of generic form or of the creative process. For an artist
to be an intellectual it is less important to have a theory of writing than to possess a
vision of how a literary work might operate in society and to assume responsibility for it.
Writers and the knowledge class
My interest in the intellectual is not as the central figure for a revolutionary politics or a
struggle within and against ‘regimes of truth’, but as the focus for an understanding of
the institutional conditions in which all writing takes place. A central preoccupation of
Cultural Studies since the inception of the Birmingham school has been the figure of the
intellectual. The most exhaustive examination (and example) of this preoccupation is
John Frow’s Cultural Studies and Cultural Value (1996). In this book Frow draws upon the
work of writers such as Alvin Gouldner, Barbara and John Ehrenreich, and Pierre
Bourdieu to situate ‘cultural intellectuals’ within a broader professional–managerial or
knowledge class.
Intellectuals are defined as professionals in possession of cultural capital, or stored
mental labour, which provides them with economic gain. For their reproduction they
rely on a system of credentialising through education, rather than non-meritocratic
authority in the form of privilege, money or state power. Frow argues that academics or
‘cultural intellectuals’ are a ‘local fraction’ of this knowledge class, with a ‘commitment to
the institutions of cultural capital, and simultaneously a set of anxieties about [their]
place within these institutions’.38
If one wished to locate Creative Writing within this framework, the awarding of
degrees in writing can be seen as an attempt to absorb the ‘placeless’ writer into the
institutional apparatus of the knowledge class by imposing systems of professional
training and accreditation on the practice of writing. This argument has often been
levelled against writing programmes. A.D. Hope, for instance, claimed in 1965, after a
visit to America, that universities were breeding their own supply of literature and soon
there would be no more wild writers left.39 Such alarmist critiques, however, tend to
neglect consideration of literature as an institutionalised profession.
One does not become a writer simply by virtue of putting pen to paper, or fingertip to
keyboard. One is credentialled as a writer by virtue of acquiring agents, securing
publishing contracts, being reviewed, selling books, and winning prizes and grants, as
well as gaining membership in professional organisations such as the Australian Society
of Authors. Writers are members of a new class of intellectuals because they control their
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Jones has reservations about the thaumatrope’s usefulness as a model of a more self-
conscious mode of cross-cultural scholarship. Perhaps the ‘blurring of identities’ that
constitutes one phase of the empathic process would dominate in montage’s ‘fast-
motioning embrace’. Perhaps the thaumatrope’s poetic effect is too like early nineteenth-
century models of hermeneutics. William Hazlitt’s essay ‘On Reason and Imagination’
provides an example of the nineteenth-century model of interaction between text and
reader:
Wherever any object takes such a hold of the mind as to make us dwell upon it, and
brood over it, melting the heart in tenderness, or kindling it to a sentiment of
enthusiasm;—wherever a movement of imagination or passion is impressed on the mind,
by which it seeks to prolong and repeat the emotion, to bring all other objects into
accord with it, and to give the same movement of harmony … to the sounds that express
it—this is poetry.27
Jones knows that in her speculation on an empathic tone or poetics to express affect
there is an echo of this and other inherited poetic and critical traditions: ‘A Romantic in
spite of myself’.28
She is not alone in apparently rejecting the romantic hermeneutics of sympathy as a
model for the politics of cross-cultural scholarship. In No Road (bitumen all the way)
Stephen Muecke suggests that instead of the blurring of identities that characterise a
romantic aesthetic based on metaphor, ‘you stand your text beside the text of the other so
there is a parallelism, perhaps only accidental encounters, like we produced in Reading
the Country’:
These two-figures—circle and parallel—represent a confrontation of methodology
between, on the one hand, the romantic aesthetic of participant ethnography, in which
the subject and object merge phenomenologically, and, on the other, the desire to retain
cultural autonomy and difference—the parallelism of both subject and object.29
Hodge and McHoul regarded Reading the Country as exemplary of a fictocritical ethic of
text and commentary. In Muecke’s model, a figure for metaphoric ‘blurring’ (montage) is
replaced by a figure for analogical contiguity (collage). Rather than seeing this as
radically different from Jones’s model, I would suggest that the focus has shifted from
‘merging’ to the self-conscious ‘detachment’ that re-opens the space between self and
other. Both these figures for empathic cross-cultural scholarship derive from the same
model of a dynamic imaginative process developed in the sentimental tradition. Read
together they rehearse the defining elements of the sentimental dialectic: ‘blurring’ and
‘detachment’. Neither is without its dangers (of obliterating difference, of reification of
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of writing enables students to understand how writers assume a narrative persona or
enter the voice of their characters, and that, in turn, discussion of craft, as a series of
technical decisions, recentres the subject, supposedly questioning theory. Too many
writers see the death of the author as the apotheosis and end point of theory, as if it had
never moved on from Barthes’s 1960s polemic, and seem to believe that their living
existence somehow disproves his thesis.
The tension between theory and practice, Miles suggests, is also ‘the conflict between
regarding writing from the point of view of the professional writer’ and ‘regarding texts
from the vantage point of literary criticism’, or between a verbal arts degree and a literary
studies degree.33 Miles argues for Creative Writing as a verbal art injected into literary
studies, which means less emphasis on the student as an aspiring writer and more on the
student as a critic. This does little to help the majority of writing programmes taught in
the former mode, which is typical of attempts to construct ‘integrated’ programmes of
creative writing and literary criticism.34
The use of Theory in Creative Writing also operates as a reconfigured aesthetics by
proposing ideal models of writing. The teaching of fictocriticism, for instance, flourishes
in the wake of the post-structuralist collapse of generic boundaries between literature
and criticism and the challenges of feminist theory to academic discourse.35 Yet post-
structuralist theory deriving from the work of Barthes and Derrida (regularly cited as
influences on fictocriticism) has been castigated for its introspective self-reflexivity and
political quietude. Deconstruction has been called the ‘new new criticism’ because its
literary appropriation by the Yale school in America enabled critics to continue their
hermetic interest in texts without considering the Foucauldian strain of post-
structuralism. As Edward Said points out, ‘Derrida’s criticism moves us into the text,
Foucault’s in and out’.36
If, like the New Humanities, Creative Writing is to go beyond Theory, it must also get
outside the text and explore how literature operates in society, not, in Foucault’s words,
as a substitute or ‘general envelope for all other discourses’, but as an active social agent
alongside other discourses.37 Creative Writing must become more than a pre-professional
training ground for artists dedicated to their craft and to a personal vision of the world
created by their imagination and realised through their individual voice or style, and for
whom theory is an antagonistic discourse. Equally, the writing workshop needs to be
more than a haven for avant-garde experimentalism where Theory provides a liberation
from outmoded generic distinctions. Rather, a new vision of authorship needs to be
elaborated, where literature is an intellectual practice alongside other non-literary
discourses in the academy, and where the division between fiction and non-fiction still
exists, but in a non-hierarchical relationship.
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the other, for example). However, the ambition of both these fictocritical effects is to
reconvene, perhaps only ideally and utopianly, feeling and thought, aesthetics and ethics,
refunctioning the dialectical movement between ‘neighbouring’ and ‘separation’ that
characterised non-Kantian sentimentalism.
Collage: sentimental allegory
The compositional pair collage/montage cannot be deployed without a contaminating
affect. Indeed, allegoricism and sadness are functions of each other, according to post-
Kantian models of the aesthetic.30 To work with fragments is to engage in a potentially
melancholy production of allegoresis, a re-coding of de-contextualised bits and pieces.31
For Walter Benjamin this ‘pile of ruins’ is the mournful point of departure for the
baroque ‘allegorical sensibility’ and, in Eric Santner’s view, ‘opens up extravagant and
excessive possibilities of recollection, recombination, and interpretation. It is in this
sense that the baroque allegorist has been regarded as the forebear of the postmodern
bricoleur.’32 As Benjamin aphoristically put it, ‘allegory is in the realm of thoughts what
ruins are in the realm of things’.33 According to Linda Nochlin, in modernity,
‘fragmentariness’ is a ‘quality shared by the perceiver–constructor and the object of
construction’.34 (What fragmentariness was to modernism, hybridity is to
postcolonialism, perhaps.) Peter Burger characterises ‘allegory which is fragment’ as the
correlative of ‘history as decline’: two responses to such historiography are utopianism
and nostalgia.35
This work on the conjunction between typographic display and elegiac tone began
with the decision to explore the politics that attends the fictocritical effect of textual
collage/montage, ‘writ[ing] with the discourse of others’.36 The reification of ‘voice’ as
textual fragment that typifies the architectonics of bricolage might now be partnered by
the attentiveness to affect implicit in listening for ‘tone’: ‘there is no escaping the crying
of the ghosts … one needs to be able to bear listening to the ghosts’.37 Self-conscious
efforts at ‘speaking montage’ are allegories of knowledge. In his essay on ‘Ethnographic
Allegory’, James Clifford notices ‘a recent tendency to distinguish allegorical levels as
specific “voices” within the text’.38 As Gregory Ulmer notes, cut and paste, collage/montage,
this self-conscious writing with fragments and spaces is ‘explicitly organized to say what
it is doing’ and ‘to provide its own commentary’.39 According to Clifford, we ‘say of it not
“this represents … that” but rather, “this is a (morally charged) story about that’’ ’.40
In fictocritical collage/montage, the blank space between text fragments is never
neutral. It can point to contradictory but paired allegorical meanings, both as a nostalgic
sign of rupture and lost totalities and as a signifier of utopian possibility. One effect is
shared: the space on the page figures in visual allegory a space in which the imagination
—
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Change (1983), where he asks ‘Can a literary intellectual, to come to the issue that most
preoccupies me, do radical work as a literary intellectual?’25 For Lentricchia and many
others throughout the 1980s, such as Jim Merod, Terry Eagleton, Paul Bove and Tony
Bennett, a literary intellectual was defined as a critic and university teacher of English,
whose specific role was to challenge the aesthetic view of literature and, in Lentricchia’s
words, ‘instigate a culturally suspicious, trouble-making readership’.26
In this formulation there is no complementary vision of the writer, within or without
the university, for literature is placed in an antagonistic relationship with criticism, and
the writer in the outdated mode of the universal intellectual. ‘To this day’, David Galef
claimed in 2000, ‘a tacit war exists between literary critics and writers, though both
usually publish and teach within the same department’.27 Some years earlier Marjorie
Perloff had described this relationship as a battle between the A Team of the Creative
Writing Workshop and the B Team of the Graduate Seminar in Theory.28 This division
may not seem so striking in Australia, but when Robert White reviewed ‘The State of
English Studies in the 1990s’, he was able to describe the relationship between theory
and Creative Writing in these terms:
It was, by and large, literary theorists who helped to ‘open the box’ of English Studies,
prising the way for creative writing as a respectable research pursuit. And yet the creative
writers, generally speaking (and with some notable exceptions) are the ones within our
English departments who are most suspicious of theory. After all, what author would
want to embrace a movement that made its reputation by killing off the author? 29
I would like to briefly consider one attempt to negotiate this division, provided by the
Englishman Robert Miles, because it is based on the same observation made by White
and has been endorsed by at least one Australian commentary as an ‘ingenious model’ of
Creative Writing pedagogy.30 ‘I believe’, Miles wrote in 1992, ‘that at bottom there is an
irreducible tension between the manoeuvres of contemporary theory and the practice of
teaching writing’.31 He argues, however, that this can be a productive tension in the
workshop, because it ‘affords the student the opportunity of comparing theories of how
texts come into being with the actual experience of bringing texts into being.’32
For Miles, ‘contemporary theory’ is exemplified by poststructuralist critiques of
authorship. But poststructuralism does not provide a theory of how texts come into
being, or an impersonal substitute for individual experience of the creative process. It
provides a theory of the production of textual meaning, based in a linguistic
unconscious. In which case, to pit empirical practice against theoretical speculation in
the writing workshop only provides a domestication of the insights of theory. It leads
Miles to claim that Barthes’s theory of the author entering his own death at the moment
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is understood to do its (various) work, in particular the imaginatively produced
‘analogical’ historical tie between selves and others. The space for an ‘imaginative
transfer’ between a ‘here’ and a ‘there’ is visualised in Muecke’s Textual Spaces, for
example, where parallel columns of type display contiguous but discrete textualised
horizons.41 The white space between is a third zone where the imagination plays the
‘ridge’ thrown up between antinomies. In Richard Kearney’s view, the ‘oscillating
movement’ required of the imagination creates the intersubjective space of ethical
praxis.‘The imagination … needs to play … in a way which animates and enlarges our
response to the other’.42 In effect, a rehearsal of the process of empathy both closes the
gap between self and other and inevitably reopens it as a condition of historical
difference. With regard to postcolonial thought, these visual aesthetics signal an urge to
ethical engagement.
The ‘play of voices’ in collage/montage attempts the aestheticising of principled
stances in relation to objects of knowledge. In the case of collage writing, the ethical
effect of multiple stories/voices is visible in the typographic layout. The spaces between
textual fragments attest to an alleged modest refusal to claim authority or to tell the
other’s story. Empathic attentiveness informs both the self-conscious production and
reception of the fictocritical collage effect. Yet empathic criticism is not unproblematic.43
Gaye Tuchman cautions that ‘whether an ethnographer or historian is working for us or
them, that person still faces the task of assemblage, of making a montage “that speaks”
(whether or not the text is understood to be multi-vocal, “a text that speaks itself”)’.44
Addressed primarily to the eye, the collage writing of the allegorist as bricoleur is
symptomatic of a mutilated and incomplete archive of the past, and/or the
incommensurability of competing ‘stories’ in the present. In Stephen Greenblatt’s words,
‘Allegory arises from the painful absence of that which it claims to recover’45 and the
collagist works with a textual equivalent of the skull as the pathetic image for loss; she
needs to be able to bear the hollowed out spaces. Jones’s call for an elegiacs of
postcolonial cross-cultural studies asks us to be affected by the effects of history: ‘Why
did imperialists collect native skulls?’.46 She invites us to ‘seek out the surfaces of new
and difficult subjects’, to imagine how ‘we might chart the distance between those brute
materialisations of political struggle … and the historical dematerialisations by which the
skulls of the vanquished become empty vessels’.47
The aestheticised ethics of the compositional pair collage/montage are offered in the
service of various mediations that make up historical and social ties. In this sense at least
the linked visual and spatial accommodation of empathy frees up a space for others in a
linguistic instance of a sentimental community without the sneer of disparagement that
accompanies Armstrong’s use of the term. Fictocriticism relies on a politicised
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operationalises the didactic heresy at the structural and syntactic level as well as the
thematic level.17 It thus perpetuates the dead end of the romantic legacy known as art for
art’s sake. The workshop model offers no figure of the writer for students and teachers
other than that of the artist dedicated to the discovery of a personal voice and the
development of a craft. The university, in this formulation, is nothing but a garret in the
ivory tower, and this attitude persists today.
For instance, the only mention of a social function for writers on the website for the
Associated Writing Programs in America is the statement that in ‘creative writing
workshops ... stories and poems are made as gifts for readers and listeners’, which is ‘a
highly civilized and humane act’.18 In Australia to date the main function of the
Australian Association of Writing Programs (established in 1996) has been to debate
whether creative work can be construed as research for the purposes of funding and
assessment.19 So the representative bodies of Creative Writing across two countries see
the writer as a literary Santa Claus or an academic careerist, both chasing professional
success in the literary establishment. Is it any wonder that Creative Writing has not
claimed a position of literary authority in the New Humanities if it cannot elaborate a
more forceful figure of the writer?
Oppositional criticism
According to Leela Gandhi, the New Humanities are characterised by ‘oppositional and
anti-humanist criticism’.20 The term ‘oppositional criticism’ derives from Edward Said’s
1983 book, The World, the Text, and the Critic: ‘Were I to use one word consistently along
with criticism (not as a modification but as an emphatic) it would be oppositional’.21
Oppositional criticism is founded on the assumption that the concept of autonomous
aesthetic value expounded by practical criticism, rather than being a spiritual salve
against a materialistic capitalist society, is in fact one of its chief ideological buttresses.
The new function of criticism, characterised by Terry Eagleton as a ‘struggle against the
bourgeois state’, breaks with the tradition of evaluation, preferring to uncover the
invisible political work that criticism does in the realm of culture by relating literary
works to the social forces of cultural production and consumption, or by undermining
their metaphysical assumptions.22 And it sees this textual critique as the base for social
change, rather than cultural defence.
The figure of the critic, then, no longer traces its lineage to John Dryden, the ‘father of
English criticism’, or to the Arnoldian tradition of cultural heritage, but to the tradition
of the intellectual with a political responsibility, and in particular the Marxist
intellectual.23 The typical model for the oppositional critic has been that of Foucault’s
‘specific intellectual’.24 This is exemplified by Frank Lentricchia’s Criticism and Social
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sentimental imagination that aims to enhance our capacity to be affected by the effects of
history. In order to develop this idea further I want to revisit the example of Stephen
Muecke’s fictocritical writing, especially Reading the Country: Introduction to Nomadology
(1984), Textual Spaces: Aboriginality and Cultural Studies (1992) and No Road (bitumen all
the way) (1997). Reading the Country avoids the effect of mastery (it doesn’t ‘speak for’
Paddy Roe’s dreaming), and avoids falling for the apparently doomed utopics of
unmediated liberty (a text that impossibly ‘speaks itself’).48 In the Road to Botany Bay: An
Essay in Spatial History, Paul Carter suggests that Reading the Country is an example of ‘the
device of the historian absenting himself as author’:
Krim Benterrak, the artist in this book, records one country, Paddy Roe, a local aborigine
… narrates another, the theoretically informed Muecke constructs yet another; but the
implication that by cutting them and overlaying them, we can attain the
multidimensionality of an aboriginal narrative seems to me an editorial illusion’.49
Muecke’s work can be read in terms of the desire ‘to replace the uni-vocal linearity of
conventional history with a “bricolage” of “texts”’. ‘It demonstrates clearly … the
authority of all viewpoints. But such an approach still perpetrates an illusion of its own;
that, in some way, the multidimensional spatiality of aboriginal culture is hereby being
imitated.’50 Paul Carter reads the ‘bricolage of texts’ as a cross-cultural hybrid writing.
Fictocriticism as ‘hybrid writing’ produces the writer’s own ‘hybridity’ as one of its
effects, and could be understood as a species of ethnographic allegory.
In a sense, Carter wants Reading the Country to valorise more successfully its textual
hybridity, inviting Muecke to perform an even more extravagant allegory than the
modesty of ‘parallelism’ or analogical contiguity would afford. It could be argued that The
Road to Botany Bay needs Reading the Country to perform its ‘geometry’ more efficiently
because Muecke’s borders, gaps and edges are the other to Carter’s preferred ‘haze which
preceded clear outlines’.51 Ken Gelder and Jane Jacobs have remarked on Carter’s
‘nostalgia for an “original” moment’, figured in the ‘haze’.52 In the terms we have been
deploying, Muecke is required to perform the political utopianism that is the other to
Carter’s alleged nostalgia. Read as responses to history as decline, the project of spatial
history is no less allegorical than Muecke’s collage.
Both projects aim to renovate critical writing on the contact zone through an
investment in kinds of metaphor that solicit activities of the reader’s empathic
imagination. Carter puts it like this in The Lie of the Land:
To avoid compacting the ground … we need to tread it lightly, circumspectly. The
approach must be poetic rather than philosophical … the challenge … is to move
differently, to learn to dissolve the emotionally catatonic and historically destructive
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opposition between mobility and stability … But for this to happen, poiesis—all that is
comprehended by the Western arts of representation—would need to undergo a
renovation.53
The analogical nature of the imaginative transfer that characterises empathy suggests that
empathy itself works ‘allegorically’. Pursuing the terms of the sentimental tradition
within which I have placed the process of empathic transfer, it is possible to see the
fictocritical effect of Carter’s ‘mobility’ and the ‘haze which preceded clear outlines’ as
equivalent to Jones’s thaumatropical montage, the blurring of self/other distinctions that
characterised the ecstatic and ex-centric phase of empathy. Jones’s thaumatrope, with its
provisional effect of the ‘fast motioning embrace’, and Carter’s restless metaphoricity of
(tactful) movement, visual haze and acoustic reverberations refunction the eighteenth-
and nineteenth-century conception of the sympathetic imagination as that which is ‘able
to penetrate the barrier that puts space between it and its object’ and ‘secure a
momentary but complete identification with it’.54 Further, Carter’s ‘haze’ belongs with
Muecke’s ‘clear outlines’: together they replay the dialectical oscillation between
‘neighbouring’ and ‘separation’, each figured though their equivalents in montage and
collage, metaphor and analogy respectively. These examples suggest the fragmented and
dispersed afterlife of a non-Kantian heritage available to cross-cultural scholarship. They
offer glimpses of how the fragments of this tradition might be (provisionally, partially)
reconvened, though it remains questionable to what extent such a renovation would
constitute a ‘radical aesthetic’.
Therapeutic melancholy and elegiac historiography
The call for a poetics of mourning in cross-cultural scholarship is a somewhat belated
gesture.55 The discussion will suggest that the predominantly Freudian idea of
melancholy as ‘obstructed’ mourning evident in certain studies of cultural trauma is a
pathologising of the second phase of the empathic process described in eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century sentimentalism. Empathic fictocritical effects in the service of cross-
cultural scholarship do not appear to regard the involvement of self and other as
problematic. Instead, the compositional pairs from the previous discussion suggest a
model in which provisional therapeutic effects might be understood to flow both from a
so-called ‘perverse’ melancholy and a ‘normal’ work of mourning.56
The Freudian tradition, according to Santner, equates the melancholy response to loss
with secondary narcissism, and intensifies it as a pathology in which the otherness of the
loved object is repressed; ‘narcissistic love plays itself out in the (non-)space where “I”
and “you” are not perceived as having hard edges’. ‘The melancholic grieves not so much
for the loss of the other as for the fact of otherness and all that entails.’57 ‘Normal’
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spiritual balm in the face of science and mass civilisation. This figure in fact appropriated
for criticism the role of the Romantic poet. Indeed it is Coleridge who first used the
term ‘practical criticism’ in his Biographia Literaria. Through ‘practical criticism’—as
he called his critical analysis of the works of Shakespeare—Coleridge hoped to discover
the essential qualities that are symptomatic of poetic power or the imagination.9 For
Coleridge, literary authority resided in the poet and, most important, the poetic process.
And Shelley uttered the most grandiloquent pronouncements on this authority of the
Romantic poet when he called poets the unacknowledged legislators of the world.10
For the Romantics, construing the literary as a site of withdrawal was in fact a political
protest. Practical criticism replaced poetic composition as the base from which the
scientific aridity and materialism of industrialised society were challenged by the human
spirit and creativity. Cleanth Brooks, a major figure among the new critics, claimed that
what he and I.A. Richards shared was an agreement that ‘the greatest and most enduring
poetry ... manifested to a high degree Coleridge’s synthesizing imagination’.11 Authority
in the academy is vested in the figure of the critic–teacher, however—the ‘priest or rabbi
of literary capital’ as Jim Merod has called him—because it is criticism that has the
responsibility of evaluating and promoting the transformative power of imaginative
literature, and its goal is to produce a readership rather than to generate new writing.12
‘Practical criticism’, according to Hugh Bredin, ‘as a teaching device, means the close
and attentive reading of literary texts, usually poetry, usually by a small group, under the
guidance of a tutor’.13 This could easily describe the writing workshop, where criticism is
applied to student manuscripts as well as literary texts. Indeed, R.P. Blackmur, whom at
least one commentator has claimed was responsible for the ‘invention’ of New Criticism,
‘earned his keep’ teaching Creative Writing with Allen Tate at Princeton University’s
Creative Arts Program from 1940.14 D.G. Myers has even claimed that ‘the method that
came to be known as “practical criticism” or “close reading” was founded upon the
sort of technical discussion of poetic problems that would occur among a group of
poets’, in particular the Fugitive group at Vanderbilt, which included many of the
New Critics.15 And Cleanth Brooks suggests that his ideas on the necessity of tension
and unity between individual words in the whole poem were gained from the
Fugitives’ poetry before I.A. Richards’s Practical Criticism displayed this concept in
critical commentary.16
Yet Creative Writing, which developed alongside the New Criticism in a handful of
American universities from the 1930s, was left with a denuded romantic aesthetics,
adopting an expressivist theory of authorship that democratised the poetic imagination
as a means of self-development, and a craft-based pedagogical practice, characterised by
the term ‘reading as a writer’, in which the ubiquitous advice to ‘show’ rather than ‘tell’
VOLUME9 NUMBER1 MAY2003190
mourning opens up the space between ‘I’ and ‘thou’, ‘here’ and ‘there’, ‘now’ and ‘then’.58
The condition of ‘continuity’ between self and other in ‘perverse’ melancholy must be
given up for the ‘contiguity’ that characterises the ‘normal’ work of mourning. In
Santner’s formulation of the Freudian paradigm:
[t]he capacity to feel grief for others and guilt for the suffering one has directly or
indirectly caused, depends on the capacity to experience empathy for the other as other.
This capacity in turn depends on the successful working through of those primitive
experiences of mourning which first consolidate the boundaries between self and other,
thereby opening up a space for empathy.59
Viewed through the tradition of sentimentalism that is perhaps a condition of possibility
for these models, it appears that the psychoanalytic tradition has not only sundered two
phases of a single process but also reversed the actions of the sympathetic imagination.
In the Freudian schema, empathy is an effect of the ‘space’ of difference that must be
opened up before empathy can occur. The ‘blurring’ of identities in the ex-centric
imaginative movement that characterised a necessary first phase of the process is
uncoupled from the differentiating ‘detachment’ that concluded the dialectic of empathy
in the sentimental tradition. Severed from its partner, this (melancholy) component is
then understood as a sickly ‘loop’ of self-involvement rather than an ecstatic movement
of self-transcending incorporation with the other. The name and value of empathy is then
given to the condition of contiguous separation, as though one part of the machinery of
empathy must now stand in for the whole ensemble.
A prominent topos of cultural analysis is that of ‘obstructed mourning’, sometimes cast
as melancholy stasis. For example, in the historiography of postwar Germany a
‘melancholy dialectic’ is understood to prevail.60 Similarly, in the historiography of early
modern American captivity narratives, Mitchell Breitwieser detects a ‘melancholy
semiotic’ as an effect of implicit injunctions against ‘excessive mourning’, a preference for
typological or emblematic techniques of analysis and a tendency to remain fixated on a
two-dimensional image of the beloved object, which is thus psychically ‘encrypted’.61
These features are read as analogous to the Freudian model of melancholic ‘failed
mourning’. In place of stasis the historian of early modern cultural trauma must deploy a
‘polymorphic mode of exegesis’,62 taking up multiple points of view from which to
examine the relationship with the loved object. However, even this pluralising of
horizons that keep opening up the space between ‘I’ and ‘thou’, ‘here’ and ‘there’, ‘now’
and ‘then’, might become merely mechanical if anxiety is not allowed to surface. This
feeling must be relived if healthy mourning is to displace a so-called ‘structural
mourning’ drained of affect. Structural mourning is understood as a defining symptom of
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Writing has followed the same trajectory as the New Humanities, emerging through
newer institutions in the wake of challenges to traditional forms of knowledge, its
historical and theoretical ties remain with the American New Criticism, which construed
the literary precisely in terms of aesthetic autonomy.6 I shall return to this later.
Creative Writing is also generally regarded as an apprenticeship for aspiring writers.
That is, it provides skills training for those who wish to enter the ‘literary establishment’
via mainstream publication. This is why writing programmes advertise the number of
‘successful’ graduates who have published their work. By the term ‘literary establishment’
I mean reviewers, editors, publishers and writers whose domain of professional work
involves the production and reception of literature, and who conceptualise this domain
as the ‘public sphere’ because it is located largely outside the academy. The response of
this literary establishment to the ‘culture wars’, bemoaning the professional jargon of
academics and the relativisation of literary value perpetrated by postmodernism,
establishes its opposition to critical theory. David Williamson’s highly successful play
Dead White Males (1995) is a locus classicus for this response.
What is at stake in this debate between writers and the academy is less an
understanding of literature than a struggle over who wields literary authority. If the
discipline of Creative Writing is to assume a non-antagonistic institutional position
within the New Humanities, I feel it is less important to engage in theoretical debates
about what constitutes literature than to ask: what is a literary intellectual? That is,
around what figure in the academy has literary authority traditionally accrued, and how
can a vision of authorship be elaborated in relation to it? This figure has been the critic.
Practical criticism
Modern academic criticism can trace its origins to the work of Matthew Arnold, for
whom the function of criticism was to contribute to the role of culture in maintaining
social stability by establishing the critical base for a continuum of literary works from age
to age.7 This cultural mission was joined with the traditional role of evaluating literature
in the professional practice and pedagogical tool known as practical criticism. The
technique for this academic movement comes from I.A. Richards’s experiments with
unattributed poems on student readers, and its theory from T.S. Eliot’s modernist notions
of impersonality in art, and it held sway over Anglo-American criticism and education
for the first part of the twentieth century due to the influence of F.R. Leavis and the
American New Critics, before spreading throughout the Commonwealth, including
Australia.8
The figure of literary authority that Practical Criticism promoted within the academy
was one of the critic as the moral guardian of our cultural heritage, finding in literature a
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the ‘posts’ (post-Holocaust, post-modernity) and in its pervasive manifestation in
theoretical discourses is characterised by particular vocabularies.
The appeal, in these discourses, to notions of shattering, rupture, mutilation,
fragmentation, to images of fissures, wounds, rifts, gaps, and abysses is familiar enough
… These discourses propose a kind of perpetual leave taking from fantasies of plenitude,
purity, centrality, totality, unity, and mastery.63
In a discursive construction that sees the decentred subject compelled to repeat the
splitting that propelled him into the symbolic order, mourning is a condition of ‘being-
in-language’.64 This gives rise to ‘an abstract mode of bereavement’ that is the condition
of all writing.
Returning to Jones’s appeal to an expressive poetics that might reanimate theory with
an elegiac tone, it becomes apparent that her targets are the ‘rhetorics of mourning’
embarrassed by appeals to actual human suffering. Rejecting the thaumatrope’s
unsatisfactorily melancholic elegiacs of repetitive ‘typological’ images, Jones turns to the
empathic consideration of particular individuals. She works to preserve the difference
between what Ricoeur calls the ‘course of history and the course of things’.65 Her
willingness to consider the resources of ‘sheer pathos’ for a politically engaged writing
refuses to accept theoreticist disparagement of the ‘banality of affect’.66 Discourses
devoted to the mechanics of structural mourning would regard the appeal to ‘humane’
affect ‘as a sign of lack of rigour, nostalgia, sentimentality’.67 Examining aspects of the
ethnography of grief, Jones considers her relationship to those others whose pain
provides the occasion for commentary. Her self-conscious decision to set aside the
typological model of cross-cultural scholarship can be read against the particularity of an
essay written ‘in memoriam’. In ‘Skulls, Fontanelles, and the Spaces Between; in memoriam
Fanny Balbuk’ Jones makes the suggestion that ‘there is a need to supplement rationalist
and mimeticist explication, to veer and seek out the surfaces of new and difficult
subjects. To veer, perhaps wildly, into realms of … the intolerable elegiac’.68 The strong
metaphorics of movement, spatialising and ecstatic excess suggest a revised template for
the other-involvement and self-forgetting that characterised the ‘first phase’ of empathy.
Her proposed cultural therapeutics in the elegiac mode would require a combination of
personal sensibility and ethical attention to particular instances. This kind of mourning
would have to risk, in Armstrong’s dismissive terms, recourse to the ‘individualist’ and
‘sentimental’, at the same time proposing affect as the unsettling ground for a ‘collective
experience’.69
In conjunction with attention to the individual case, healthy mourning predicated on
a ‘polymorphic mode of exegesis’ allegedly requires a continual and pain-filled reviewing
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of the evidence. A vocabulary of dynamic movement, strongly reminiscent of Paul
Carter’s model for a renovated poiesis, characterises this model: ‘mourning demands
perpetual motion, allows for no such [typological] fixities, provides neither certainty nor
stasis’. The denigration of stasis in favour of a ‘nomadic wandering’ through the
archive,70 forever unsettling the orientation of self/other, here/there, now/then, is a
familiar contemporary topos. In the postmodern critical heritage decentred subjectivities
are urged to embrace the play of differences.
Postmodern critics invite readers to mourn the shattered fantasy of the (always already)
lost organic society that has haunted the Western imagination and to learn to tolerate the
complexities and instabilities of new social arrangements as well as more hybrid … forms
of personal, sexual, cultural, and political identity. It is a matter of learning to live as a
nomad, as one who has learned that survival is a constant improvisation.71
Hybrid writing, nomadology and collage/montage effects all too readily slot into this
rhetoric of structural mourning. Further, the accord between models of global,
postmodern, nomadic and affectless structural mourning and the American, early
modern ‘wandering up and down’ of ‘grief in motion’ might raise suspicions that
mourning is not inevitably remedial in its role as a cultural analytic.
In ‘Skulls, Fontanelles and the Spaces Between’ Gail Jones nonetheless risks
refunctioning the melancholy stasis represented by the ‘skulls of the vanquished’,
imagining instead the resistant spatial stories mapped by the Indigenous woman’s
defiantly walking the colonial city. Imagining Balbuk’s ‘wandering up and down’ as a
work of mourning, Jones pays attention to a passionate journeying that at once produces
‘the space of the elegiac’ and ‘political bravery’.72 This attempt to imagine what
fictocritical effects might be possible when writing with the ‘feelings left out of the
historical narrative’ returns affect to postmodern nomadism, remediating a potentially
structural mourning.73 For Walter Benjamin, the quintessential object of baroque
allegory is the skull, empty, silent, appropriable. Jones takes the ‘skulls of the
vanquished’, people reduced to the order of things, as a point of departure for a counter-
discursive move. The particularity of the elegiac gesture, ‘in memoriam Fanny Balbuk’,
marks this as a work of mourning, refunctioning the stasis of melancholy skulls with the
imaginative animation of Fanny Balbuk’s movements. The melancholy field of
postcolonial studies might, momentarily, resonate with the tone of a new elegiac
historiography, honouring the ‘simultaneous delectation and refusal of the experience of
loss’.74 Balbuk’s ‘spatial stories’ figure a methodology for inconsolable suffering, the ‘acute
state of mourning’ that ‘is the only way of perpetuating that love which we do not want
to relinquish’.75 Jones has to perform a double gesture, honouring the melancholy
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repetition compulsion of Balbuk’s refusal to ‘let go’ of Indigenous cultural places and
spaces, and modelling an elegiac historiography as a work of mourning that can preserve
the order of history through the analogical tie of self and other.
What then of the ‘extravagant’ allegorical conjunction between collage effects and the
‘intolerable elegiac’ sketched so far? It takes a bit of effort to overcome the resistance of
the materials in this act of temporary reconciliation, knowing that things are ‘never
[neatly] back to back’.76 The suggestion that they are two sides of each other asserts a
continuity between montage and elegy. This is rather different from the rupture implied
by Jones’s speculation that a wild veering in the direction of the elegiac would trace the
surface of new (however difficult and resistant) problems. Might we find in
contemporary versions of the impulse to ethically ‘utopian’ collage/montage, ‘the spaces
between’ and allegories of discursive reconciliation, a simultaneous desire to turn away
from, and an inability to leave behind, the melancholy devices of a failed modernism? In
any case, fictocritical cross-cultural writing seems unwilling to pathologise the resources
of melancholy. Read back through the sentimental tradition, melancholy and mourning
belong together as elements available to an aestheticised ethics.
Elegy and fictocritical excess
Fictocritical effects that oscillate between the compositional pair of (perverse)
melancholy and (normal) mourning allow us to glimpse the architectonics of ‘a project’,
in Nochlin’s words, ‘that includes love and suffering’.77 Such a project is evident in artist
and writer Rod Moss’s ‘Elegy’, written for members of two Aboriginal families.78 An
attention to typography, mimicking the centred text of a gravestone, is combined with a
tone that Jones might label ‘sheer pathos’.79 This combination strongly recalls the poetics
of romantic epitaph and the valorising of fragmentariness but, in a potentially counter-
discursive move, the epitaphic aesthetic does not ventriloquise the voice of the other. In
Moss’s work the text/image combination is allegorical. The collage speaks of his cultural
difference. ‘Grief finds its focus’ in a photograph that becomes the occasion for the
writing. ‘This non-Arrernte focus. This photo. These published solitary thoughts. Such
documentation is anti-thetical to their letting go’.80 The potentially melancholy fixation
on a static two-dimensional image is supplemented by an exorbitant, even embarrassing
‘tone’, here put into the service of a politically engaged writing.
The elegiac ‘tone’ is perhaps attractive to the white commentator who needs to mark
out a principled stance off-centre, because it suggests the intensity of ‘neighbouring’ but
keeps open the space of ‘separation’, or analytic detachment, characterising the final
phase of the empathic process. Just as Jones’s ‘scientific toy’ enacted the symbolic
—
VOLUME9 NUMBER1 MAY2003194
management of desire and loss in an uncanny refunctioning of Freud’s paradigmatic ‘fort-
da’ game as mourning play, so Moss uses a photograph to dose out the homeopathic pain
of mourning.
The photo stays in the bedroom. Pettrina and Christine Johnson are variously maternal
about our infant girl whose whiteness and stiffness bequeath a hyper-reality of
unbelonging … Most urgent are the upturned, cupped hands of Christine … It is, with
hindsight of her imminent death at 23, a pleading to suckle that will go unfulfilled. And
the intense, dry air fights her off, as, one feels, the child would do. Today, Pettrina
remains childless …81
Sadness and desire sit side by side. The white man’s sadness is paired with the Aboriginal
women’s ostensible desire for the white baby. Just such a conduction back and forward
between sadness and desire, separation and neighbouring, is allegorised in Gail Jones’s
‘Thaumatropes’, an essay also partly concerned with writing about Aboriginal expressions
of grief in the context of cinematic experience (the death of John Wayne, for example).
‘To grieve for John Wayne is insubordinate; it is a reclaiming of social consequence from
mere simulacra; it is a conversion of the specular into the performative’.82 Moss uses the
fragmentary form of the epitaph and the ‘fort-da’ effect of re-viewing the photograph to
reclaim the social consequence of mere simulacra, oscillating between the specular and
performative. As a recapitulation of the model of empathy to which I have been referring,
Moss’s ‘Elegy’ maps the phases that are familiar from the sentimental tradition.
One effect of this conjunction of elegiac tone, epitaphic form and photographic image
for reviewing real and imaginary relationships is to complicate Armstrong’s potentially
reductive version of empathy. The appeal to multiple points of view marks Moss’s ‘Elegy’
as a vehicle for representing the effect of ‘open intersubjectivity’ favoured in recent
studies of consciousness. In Evan Thompson’s view, empathy is a ‘self-displacing’ or ‘self-
othering’ act.
Empathy involves a displacement or fission between my empathizing self and the
empathized other; recollection between my present recollecting self and my past
recollected self … imagination between myself imagining and myself imagined … and
reflection between my reflecting self and the experiences I reflect upon.83
Armstrong’s idea that empathy is ‘individualist’ seems to presume a unitary, monolithic
ego pitched against other such constituted egos in a ‘power-ridden construction of
relations’.84 In their exploration of the poetics of melancholy and mourning Jones and
Moss risk demonstrating that the space of the elegaic is also the space of multiple,
fantastic and imaginatively projected relations. The ego, for Thompson, is structured or
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inhabited by many ‘inner splittings’ or ‘inner openings’ that ‘intrinsically involve
otherness’.85 Similarly, Jones and Moss suggest a poetics of displacement or fission, the
effect of being ‘beside oneself’ as well as alongside the other.
Despite this, ‘Elegy’ might fail to escape entirely Armstrong’s accusation. The risky
aesthetic of self-othering might prove ‘power-ridden’ all the same. Jones self-consciously
explores the thaumatrope’s conjunction of black woman and white baby as a point of
conduction for her nostalgic dream of (un)belonging to the black mother. At the same
time, the thaumatrope’s ‘fast-motioning embrace’ utopianly repairs the ruptures among
generalised Stolen Generations. Along similar lines, but apparently without self-
consciousness, Moss’s inevitably allegorical photograph provides the occasion for a
fantasy projection in which the colonialist discourse of the indigene-as-child is oddly
inverted. To regard unself-consiousness as a naive fault is to side with the view that self-
reflexion is the necessary condition for critical effects. The poetics of self-reflexivity
would repay attention on another occasion. ‘Elegy’ works with the inherited split
between melancholy and mourning but treats them as a compositional pair, oscillating
between melancholy ‘photographic’ stasis and the ‘narrative’ dynamic of mourning. Such
a compositional ensemble reconvenes the dispersed elements of the empathic process but
cannot undo the separation and reversal that characterise their contemporary afterlife in
psychoanalytic discourse. As the dialectical model of melancholy and mourning suggests,
fictocritical cross-cultural writing of this kind will struggle against the resistance of the
materials with which it must work, replaying the ‘neighbouring’ and ‘separation’ of the
ethical and the aesthetic. ‘Elegy’ is significant for its adoption of a tone and a form in
which to write about the unsettling ethical imperatives of mourning, and the feelings left
out of historical narratives.
Historiography, postcolonial allegoricism and the dialectic of mourning
Along with the call for postcolonial studies to honour the affects that remain as traumatic
historical effects, comes the need to heal our failed readings of problematic archives.
‘Who has stories to tell? What are their methodologies? How do they speak to their
readers? What are the tones of their voices?’86 The therapeutic role of ‘empathic witness/
analyst’ falls to the cross-cultural writer who aims to provide an ethically charged, co-
constituted space for postcolonial memorial aesthetics.87 To David Carter’s ‘ought’ of the
postcolonial ethics of hybridity we might now add the ‘ought’ of an ethics of mourning.
The question that always troubles melancholy and mourning remains: can grief have a
‘proper’ place? Jones’s assertion that an audience might find the elegiac ‘intolerable’88
suggests that postcolonial elegy might be regarded as somehow troubling. Jones’s
—
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proposal to enact an extravagant and excessive grieving, and her implication that elegy is
potentially insubordinate, sit uneasily alongside literary elegy’s traditional attachment to
the effective management of mourning through the substitution of poetry for grief (its
containment and closure of grief, its attachment to the protocols of inheritance). This
should remind us that the sentimental tradition, through which these poetics of
melancholy and mourning are being read, is itself invested in the management of a
threatened rupture (between thought and feeling). Further, when Stern concludes that
the dialectical work of mourning might ‘increase the chance that traumas in
representation will show themselves’ as ‘authentic history’, in ‘places that mark the
incomplete healing of the wound of grief’, she brings into view precisely the danger that
lurks in this poetics.89 In what amounts to a valorising of the work of the empathic
imagination as the vehicle for a version of ‘history as poetry’ regarded with suspicion in
other disciplinary contexts, history as the poetics of mourning would have to confront
the perennial legacy of the sentimental tradition. The affective turn that would drive such
an allegedly therapeutic discourse cannot reconvene the ethical and aesthetic spheres in
the blur of a fast-motioning embrace. It can only reproduce and attempt to manage the
dialectic between neighbouring but separate spheres.
The appeal to affect inevitably raises the sentimental bugbear of ‘authentic feeling’, if
not simply in the sense implied by Coleridge’s warning that ‘Poetry—excites us to
artificial feelings—makes us callous of real ones’.90 Something of this question of
authenticity lurks in Armstrong’s view of empathy as ideological, a ‘false’ feeling in the
service of an unethical individualism. In what might be understood as the compositional
partner of this problem, the sentimental tradition is predicated on a universalist model of
human ‘fellow-feeling’. This assumption of innate moral sense often sneaks back in to
discussion of aesthetics, ethics and empathy, with calls for moral sympathy as the
preferred vehicle for a renovated humanism. These are just two of the problems that
redeploying elements of sentimentalism must confront in any call for ‘an ethics of writing
history’.91 In conclusion it remains to suggest how fictocritical cross-cultural writing
might refunction the allegoricism of colonialist historiography by recourse to the ethical
imperatives of mourning. In the discourses of colonialism, allegories of history prove
effective modes of cross-cultural management.92 In the discourses of postcolonial
therapeutics, especially the ethical imperative of mourning, it might appear that empathy
is called upon to facilitate a refiguring of colonial allegoresis. In particular, the ethic of
mourning would supplement the ethic of hybridity as method and effect of
contemporary allegories of knowledge. I will suggest that this is an inevitable move when
mourning and postcolonial counter-discursive allegoresis are understood to perform the
same dialectical process.
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Breitwieser has suggested that the work of mourning is the ‘doing of history’.93 In
modelling this as a perpetual analytic reviewing of our ‘wounds’ in a dynamic process,
rejecting static typologies and eventually letting go of grief, ‘normal’ mourning is
represented as ‘dialectic’s purest case’.94 Read back through the models of empathy that
characterise sentimentalist ethics, it is apparent that Breitwieser still relies on the rupture
and reversal of phases of the empathic process effective in psychoanalytic theory. Despite
the insight that mourning is a metaphor for dialectical praxis, Breitwieser leaves in place
the pathologising of melancholy stasis, incorporation and fascinated continuity,
privileging the detachment and contiguity of self and other that should conclude not make
possible the empathic process. Breitwieser’s investment in ‘nomadic’ ‘perpetual motion’ is
at once an uncanny reverberation of an earlier romantic conception of the empathic
ethical process and a perhaps strategic deployment of vocabularies available in
contemporary theoretical discourses.
In his model for a remediating counter-discursive postcolonial allegoresis, Stephen
Slemon maps a strikingly parallel process. Refusing the ‘static’, monolithic ‘units of
knowledge’ that characterise colonial allegories of history, the postcolonial allegorist uses
fictional narratives to set things moving:
Such acts of postcolonial literary resistance function counter-discursively because they
‘read’ the dominant colonialist discursive system as a whole in its possibilities and
operations and force that discourse’s synchronic or unitary account of the cultural
situation towards the movement of the diachronic.95
History as narrative fiction, like mourning, is predicated on a case-by-case and
pluralising review of the archive to forestall interpretive generalisation. Reading history
‘in adjacency to a fictional re-enactment of it’, ‘the creative and transformative exercise of
reading opens a space within which new ways of formulating the past can come into
being’. An effect of remediation is predicated on a space opening up, a fissuring of unity
in ‘heteroglossic structures’ of ‘dialectical reiteration’.96 This model effectively replicates
the dialectic of mourning in the Freudian version preferred by Santner, Breitwieser and
Stern, for example. In particular, it dispenses with the resources of allegorical figures,
casting these as the equivalent of the static images deployed in the repetition compulsion
of perverse melancholy fixation. Just as Santner, Breitwieser and Stern reserve empathy
as a healthy effect of the ‘contiguity’ made possible by a process of ‘grief in motion’,
Slemon favours the ‘adjacency’ of a reading practice made possible by allegory in motion.
It is not entirely clear that historiography as mourning and counter-discursive allegoresis
must inevitably repeat the rupture and reversal of the mechanisms that drove the
machinery of empathy in the sentimental tradition. Nevertheless, fictocritical ‘grief in
VOLUME9 NUMBER1 MAY2003198
motion’ appears unwilling to dispense altogether with the resources of melancholy,
perhaps because together melancholy and mourning reconvene valuable elements of the
empathic process that characterised an earlier sentimental tradition.97
The very name ‘fictocriticism’ bears the (nostalgic) history and the (utopian) promise
of a dialectic in which the compositional pairs to which this discussion has drawn
attention oscillate between ‘neighbouring’ and ‘separation’. Fictocritical investments in
rhetorics of mourning and counter-discursive allegoricism as ‘history’ cannot reinstall a
Shaftesburian plenitude, fictocritical effects are nonetheless produced out of various re-
combinations of a fragmented and dispersed tradition in which ethics and aesthetics
once belonged to the same imaginative faculty.98 Fictocritical effects of analogical
continuity produced by the (post)modernist allegorical sensibility still depend on
vocabularies and concepts that attach to traditional activities of the imagination—for
example, empathy and the work of mourning. While these allegories of knowledge might
prove therapeutic for the discourse of postcolonial studies and its institutional audiences,
it remains problematic whether or not the empathic ambition of fictocriticism can have a
reparative effect for those who typically provide the occasion for writing. Even so, in the
Australian context, acknowledgement of affects as important effects of history is still
politically urgent. In this sense at least, fictocritical empathy and the work of mourning
might be necessary, if not sufficiently radical, aesthetic gestures, keeping in view the
analogical historical ties between selves and others in particular settler communities.
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